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Abstract: The present paper investigates the determination of the bargaining agenda in a 
unionised monopoly with managerial delegation, without and with network effects in 
consumption. First, we show that, in contrast with the received literature, monopolist hires a 
manager even in the absence of risk-sharing and asymmetric information considerations. 
Without network effects, in contrast to standard oligopoly results, managerial delegation 
benefits the monopolist, while harms consumers, workers and society. Moreover, in contrast 
to the conventional wisdom, monopoly profits with managerial delegation are higher with 
sequential Efficient Bargaining (EB) than Right-to-Manage (RTM), while union’s welfare 
can be higher with RTM than EB: then a conflict of interests between the parties may exist 
but, paradoxically, for reverted choices of the bargaining agenda. Consumption externalities 
change the picture: managerial delegation benefits consumers, workers and society, 
provided that the network effect is sufficiently strong and union’s power relatively low. The 
monopolist still prefers sequential EB; however, the union’s welfare becomes larger under 
EB even for relatively low value of their power, provided that the network effect is 
sufficiently strong. Thus, the monopolist and the union endogenously choose the EB agenda 
which is also Pareto-superior. 
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Introduction 
 
The unionisation of oligopolistic and monopolistic firms is  widely observed  in the 
real life cases (e.g., Booth, 1995). On the other hand, the separation between 
ownership and management is a well established fact of the modern corporate 
governance (e.g. Berle and Means, 1932; Baumol, 1958). In particular, the strategic 
use of incentive contracts in oligopolistic markets where decisions are delegated to 
managers has been introduced in the literature by the pioneering works by Vickers 
(1985), Fershtman (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) (VFJS 
from here onwards). According to VFJS, owners try to motivate their managers 
through compensation contracts (i.e. with a bonus based on a weighted sum of profits 
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and sales, denoted as “sales delegation”), with the aim to conduct a more aggressive 
behaviour to gain a competitive advantage in the market.  
Clearly, such a strategic effect does not exist in the case of monopoly. However, 
managerial delegation as well as unionisation are widely observed in monopolistic 
firms. Therefore, it is natural to revisit the issue of the bargaining agenda selection 
between monopolist and union in a context of a managerial firm where the manager 
hired by monopolist is the bargainer with the union.  A novelty of this paper is that a 
monopolist finds convenient to assume a manager to whom output and bargaining 
decisions are delegated, despite the absence of any risk-sharing and asymmetric 
information considerations, in sharp contrast with the received literature.
1
 
The issue of the bargaining agenda has been recently investigated by some works in 
an oligopoly context, such as Bughin (1999), Buccella (2011) and Fanti (2015). Such 
papers have shown mixed results; however, all of them have abstracted from the 
managerial delegation as well as consumption/network externalities.
2
  
In particular, in the first section of the paper, the following questions are tackled: 1) is 
it profitable for the monopolist to hire a manager to delegate him the task of 
bargaining with union?; 2) how does the introduction of managerial delegation affect 
the equilibrium welfare of consumers, union and society?; 3) does the conventional 
result that monopoly firm always prefers Right-to-Manage (RTM) to Efficient 
Bargaining (EB) (and the union always prefers EB to RTM) hold true when there is a 
manager to whom it is delegated the task to bargain with the union?  
Moreover, an increasing recent literature argued that there are positive consumption 
externalities (or network effects) which may modify the results of the standard 
models of imperfect competition (e.g., Katz and Shapiro, 1985, Cabral et al., 1999). It 
is known that, for many products, the utility derived by one consumer of the good 
increases with the number of other consumers of that good, as in the cases, for 
example, of telephone and software goods.
3
 Thus, a positive network externality 
exists if the quantity of a good demanded by a consumer increases in response to an 
increase in purchases by other consumers, that is, a consumer wishes to possess a 
good in part because others do.
4
 In principle, the consumers' expectations about the 
total sales of the goods may be affected by different mechanisms of output decisions 
                                                 
1
 A clear example of the common wisdom  is in the words of the early authoritative contributors to 
the managerial delegation literature: “In the case of a monopoly firm […..]  in the absence of risk-
sharing and asymmetric information considerations, such an owner will motivate his manager to 
maximize profits.” (Fershtmann and Judd (1987), 928). 
2
 However a recent growing literature has shown that the effects of network externalities may be 
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3
 In fact the utility of a particular consumer from using a telephone or a software  increases with the 
number of other telephone or software users. 
4
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and different production costs and, thus, by different labour market institutions. 
Therefore, subsequently in a second section, consumption externalities are taken into 
account and the effects of the interaction between the introduction of the managerial 
delegation and the network effects are analysed. 
We show that the convenience to hire a manager, despite the absence of strategic 
product market interdependence, may depend on the strategic role that the managerial 
delegation plays on the bargaining between manager and union. Moreover, we show 
that the choice of the bargaining agenda is considerably affected by the fact whether 
output and bargaining choices are delegated to managers. In particular, the 
conventional result that profit under RTM is larger than EB (i.e. simultaneous and 
sequential EB have the same equilibrium outcomes) is reverted. The reason is that the 
managerial delegation may be used by monopolist as a device to weaken the wage 
claims through a larger penalization for output (employment) in the manager’s bonus 
scheme. Therefore, such a device is more effective to dampen the wage claims in the 
case of EB than in the RTM one. This remains true also under network effects which, 
in turn, push the monopolist to incentive rather than to penalise for output 
(employment) its manager because the expansive effect on the consumers’ 
expectations and thus on prices outweighs the effects on wage costs. However, such 
an incentive in the case of sequential EB remains always lower than in the case of 
RTM (note that, as below detailed, with network effects the equilibrium outcomes of 
simultaneous and sequential EB are different) and thus also with network effects the 
wages continue to be lower in the sequential EB case. Consequently, the monopolist 
still prefers the sequential EB agenda.   
By contrast, the effects of the managerial delegation on the union’s utility, and thus 
on its preferred agenda, work in an opposite direction with respect to the monopolist. 
In fact, the conventional result that the union prefers EB is reverted exactly for the 
same reason for which the preferred agenda of the monopolist has been reverted, as 
above discussed. As a consequence, the conflict of interests between monopolist and 
union remains true. However, the network effects imply an important qualitative 
change for the union’s utility (differently to what occurs to the monopolist profit) and 
for its preferred agenda. In fact, the incentive for output (employment) used to 
increase the consumer’s expectations about the network size reduces the relative 
negative wage differential between the sequential EB and RTM agendas, to the extent 
that the sequential EB agenda switches to be, as in the standard monopoly, the 
preferred one. Therefore, there is agreement on the sequential EB agenda between the 
monopolist and the union provided that the network effects are sufficiently strong 
(relatively to the union’s power). Interestingly, when the network effect is sufficiently 
strong and union’s power sufficiently low, also consumers, workers and society as a 
whole prefer sequential EB rather than RTM and are beneficiated by the presence of 
managerial delegation. Thus, not only the EB agenda is endogenously chosen by 
monopolist and union but it is also Pareto-superior. 
We consider that the three stages of the game involved are as follows. In the first 
stage, the monopolist decides the (publicly observable) incentive parameter so that 
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profit is maximized. In the second stage, both in the RTM and sequential EB cases, 
the monopolist-union bargaining unit bargain over wages to maximise the Nash 
product while, under simultaneous EB, the monopolist-union bargaining unit bargain 
concurrently over wages and employment to maximise the Nash product. In the third 
stage 1) in the RTM case, the monopolist chooses quantity (alternatively, price) to 
maximize profit, 2) in the sequential EB case, the monopolist-union bargaining unit 
bargain  quantities (alternatively, price) to maximise the Nash product.  
Moreover, in the presence of consumption externalities, managerial delegation may 
serve as a commitment instrument which influences consumers' expectations about 
the size of the market, thus increasing their willingness to pay in its favour (e.g. 
Battacharjee and Pal, 2013). Therefore, in the case of consumption externalities, 
managerial delegation has a twofold strategic effect for a monopolist: on the one 
hand, to put a brake to the wage claims in the bargaining with unions through a 
penalization for output (employment) and, on the other hand, to affect in its favour 
consumers' expectations regarding product market size, through an incentive for 
output (employment). Clearly, these two effects are of opposite sign as regards 
whether manager has to be rewarded or punished for output (employment). As shown 
below, the sign of the manager’s bonus will depend on the relative strength of the 
network effects and union’s power effects. 
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model of a unionised 
monopoly firm with managerial delegation, while Section 3 extends it with network 
effects. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. The model 
 
Let us consider that there is only one firm in the market producing a good. 
The standard  inverse demand function faced by the monopolist is given by  
qap       (1) 
where p and q  are the price and quantity of good, respectively. By assuming, as usual, 
a constant returns technology in the sole labour input, that is Lq  , where L is the 
employment,  the monopolist’s profit function is given by: 
qwp )(  ,   (2) 
where w is the per unit of output wage. 
We assume that the monopolistic firm is unionised.
5
 We consider the two typical 
negotiation models of the trade-union economics (Booth, 1995): 1) the Right-to-
Manage model (RTM) (e.g. Nickell and Andrews, 1983), in which wages are the 
outcome of negotiations between firms and unionized labour; however, once wages 
are set, the firms have the right to set the employment levels; and 2) the efficient 
bargaining model (EB) which prescribes that the union and the firm are bargaining 
over both wages and employment (or, more realistically, hours of work). Wages and 
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employment negotiations may occur either simultaneously (e.g. McDonald and 
Solow, 1981; Ashenfelter and Brown, 1986), or sequentially (Manning, 1987a,b). 
The union has the following utility function:
6
   
   
 LwwV )(  ,              (3)  
 
where w° is the reservation or competitive wage. Therefore, by recalling Lq  , eq. (3) 
becomes  
 
( )V w w q   ,           (4)  
 
that is, the unions’ objective function is to maximise the total rent.  
Moreover, we assume that the monopolist hires a manager and delegates the output 
decision and the bargaining with the union to this manager, paid through a bonus. 
Specifically, as regards the determination of the manager’s bonus, we follow here the 
papers of Vickers (1985), Jansen et al. (2007, 2009), van Witteloostuijn et al. (2007), 
Fanti and Meccheri (2013) and Meccheri and Fanti (2015), which assume a bonus of 
the manager proportional to  
zqU          (5) 
where   denotes the profits of the firm and the weight on output z is a positive 
(negative) number if the owner incentives (disincentives) the manager’s choice of 
quantity.
 
 
Let us begin by illustrating the cases of RTM and EB, both in the simultaneous and 
sequential configurations. 
 
2.1 RTM institution 
 
At stage 3, solving the utility maximisation problem of the manager in eq. (5), we get 
the following output function,  
 
    
 
2
)(
wza
wq

       (6) 
 
In the second stage of the game, under Right-to-Manage, manager- union bargaining 
unit selects w, to maximize the following generalized Nash product, 
        bbbb
wtrw
qwwqzqwaVUN 
 11
...
)(max    (7)  
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 This is a specific case of the more general Stone-Geary utility function, i.e., Pencavel (1985), 
Dowrick and Spencer (1994): 
  V w w l

   . 
 A value of 1   gives the rent-maximising case (i.e., the union seeks to maximise the total 
rent); values of ( )1     imply that the union is less (more) concerned about wages and more (less) 
concerned about jobs). Moreover, the unions aims to maximise the wage bill when 0w . 
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where b  represents the union’s bargaining  power.   
Maximising eq. (7) with respect to w, after substitution of eq. (6) in (7), we obtain the 
wage as a function of the weight on quantities, z: 
    
 
2
)2()( bwbza
w

      (8) 
By using (8) we obtain output as a function of the weight on quantities: 
 
 
4
)2(
)(


wzab
zqRTM     (9) 
By using (8) and (9) the profit as a function of the weight on quantities is obtained: 
  
16
)2()2(()2()2(
)(


babzbwwzab
zRTM  (10) 
and at first stage of the game the monopolist maximises his profit selecting z: 
     
 
 2


b
wab
z RTM       (11) 
The equilibrium outcomes are 
           
2
RTM ab ww
b
 


      (12) 
 
)2(2
))(2(



b
wab
qRTM      (13) 
 
 )24
)2(
2



b
wabRTM     (14) 
2
2
(2 )( )
2( 2)
RTM b b a wV
b
  


    (15) 
 
  2
22
28
)2(



b
wab
CS RTM     (16) 
   
  2
2
28
)2()65



b
wabb
SW RTM    (17) 
 
 
2.2. Efficient Bargaining institution. 
 
Under efficient-bargaining the manager-union bargaining unit maximizes the 
following generalised Nash product, 
       bbbb qwwqzqwaVUN )()( 11     (18).  
Hence, the manager-union bargaining unit selects at the first stage w  and at the 
second stage q (or equivalently L), in the case of SEB or, alternatively, 
simultaneously w and q in the case of EB. 
 
2.2.1.  Sequential Efficient Bargaining  
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At the third stage, from the first-order condition of the efficient bargaining game 
between manager and union, the monopolist’s output function for given w and z is the 
following:  
   
 
b
wza
zwq



2
),(     (19) 
At the second stage, after substitution of (19) in (18) and the usual maximisation 
procedure w.r.t. w, we obtain the wage: 
2
)2()( bwbza
wSEB

       (20) 
By using (20) in (19) we obtain output as a function of z: 
)2(2
)2)((
)(
b
bwza
zq SEB


      (21) 
 
By using (20) and (21)  the profit as a function of the weight on sales is obtained: 
 
( )[(1 )( ) (1 ) ]
( )
4
SEB a z w b a w b zz
       
  (22) 
 
and at first stage of the game the monopolist maximises his profit selecting z: 
 
( )
0
1
SEB a w bz
b
 
  

    (23) 
The equilibrium outcomes are 
( ) 2
2(1 )
SEB a w b ww
b
   


      (24) 
( )
2(1 )
SEB a wq
b
 


      (25) 
2( )
4(1 )
SEB a w
b

 


     (26) 
2
2
( )
4(1 )
SEB b a wV
b
 


     (27) 
2
2
( )
8(1 )
SEB a wCS
b
 


     (28) 
2
( )[( ) 4(1 )]
8(1 )
SEB a w a w bSW
b
     


    (29) 
 
Finally we note that the equilibrium outcomes of the Simultaneous EB are the same 
of the Sequential EB (the straightforward demonstration is omitted here for economy 
of space).  
 
2.3. Benchmark equilibrium outcomes for the profit-maximising monopoly. 
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Now we report here the equilibrium outcomes of the standard case of a profit-
maximising monopoly (PM) for the purpose of comparison with those of the 
managerial monopoly above presented, for the cases of RTM and SEB, respectively. 
 
 (2 )
2
RTM
PM
ab w b
w
  
     (12.bis) 
 (2 )( )
4
RTM
PM
b a w
q
  
      (13.bis) 
 
22(2 )
16
RTM
PM
b a w

  
     (14.bis) 
 
2
(2 )
8
RTM
PM
b b a w
V
  
     (15.bis) 
 
22(2 )
32
RTM
PM
b a w
CS
  
    (16.bis) 
   
2
6) (2 )
32
RTM
PM
b b a w
SW
   
   (17.bis) 
 
 
(2 )
2
SEB
PM
ab w b
w
  
    (24.bis) 
 
( )
2
SEB
PM
a w
q
 
     (25.bis) 
2(1 )( )
4
SEB
PM
b a w

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    (26.bis) 
   
2( )
4
SEB
PM
b a w
V
 
     (27.bis) 
2( )
8
SEB
PM
a w
CS
 
     (28.bis) 
23( )
8
SEB
PM
a w
SW
 
    (29.bis) 
 
2.4 Discussion of the findings in the standard case (without consumption 
externalities). 
 
In this section, first, we comment the effects of the managerial delegation on the 
unionised wage. Second, we establish the effects of the introduction of the 
managerial delegation on the equilibrium outcomes. Third, we determine the 
preferred bargaining agenda by monopolist and union. 
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Lemma 1. The manager’s bonus tends to increases wages in the same way under the 
different bargaining arrangements and to increases output (employment) more in the 
SEB case than in the RTM case.  
Proof: by simply observing and comparing (8) and (20), and (9) and (21), 
respectively. 
 
Lemma 2. The manager is penalised for output (employment) more under SEB than 
under RTM (i.e. 0 RTMSEB zz ).  
Proof: by simply observing and comparing (11) and (23).  
 
Lemma 3. At equilibrium the wage under RTM is always higher than that under SEB 
(or EB). 
Proof: by simply observing and comparing (12) and (24). 
 
The economic intuition is that 1) since the manager’s bonus increases wages the 
monopolist fixes a “negative” bonus to dampen union’s wage claims, and 2) since the 
bonus’ effect on wages is uniform while that on output is lower in the RTM case, 
then the “penalization” for output is allowed be lower in the RTM case in order to 
sustain better firm’s output. As a result of the working of the manager’s incentive 
scheme, at equilibrium the wage under RTM is always higher than that under SEB (or 
EB). 
 
Result 1. The introduction of the managerial delegation in both bargaining 
arrangement cases at equilibrium increases profits and reduces the welfare of the 
union, consumer and society. 
Proof: the result follows straightforwardly by observing that 0 SEBPM
SEB  , 
0
RTM
PM
RTM  , 0 SEBPM
SEB VV , 0 RTMPM
RTM VV , 0 SEBPM
SEB CSCS , 
0
RTM
PM
RTM CSCS , 0 SEBPM
SEB SWSW , 0 RTMPM
RTM SWSW  
 
This result is in contrast with that in the standard VFJS’s approach in non-unionised 
oligopoly (where at equilibrium profits are reduced and the consumer and social 
welfare are enhanced); in the present case the monopolist may use the delegation as a 
device to weaken union’s claims and thus profits are increased because the wage 
costs reduction is larger than the output (employment) reduction but consumers, 
workers and society as a whole are harmed. 
 
Result 2. Under managerial delegation the SEB (or EB) bargaining agenda is more 
profitable for the monopolist, in sharp contrast to the standard case of profit-
maximising behaviour. On the other hand, the welfare of the consumer and society is 
larger under SEB (or EB) than RTM, as in the standard case of profit-maximising 
behaviour. 
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Proof: the result follows straightforwardly by observing that, on the one side, 
0 RTMSEB  , 0 RTMSEB CSCS , 0 RTMSEB SWSW , and, on the other side, 
0
RTM
PM
SEB
PM  , 0
RTM
PM
SEB
PM CSCS , 0
RTM
PM
SEB
PM SWSW . 
 
Result 3. As regards the union, again in contrast with the standard case of profit-
maximising behaviour, its utility is larger under RTM (except for a its very high 
bargaining power, i.e. b>0.78).  
Proof: the result follows straightforwardly by observing that, on the one side, 
17 1
0 0.78
4
SEB RTMV V b
  
  
 
 and, on the other side,  0 RTMPM
SEB
PM VV . 
 
The intuition of this unconventional result as regards the monopolist is that the wage 
under SEB is always lower (Lemma 3) due to the mechanism of the managerial 
delegation above described. As regards the union the effect of a lower wage 
overweighs that of higher employment (and thus, unconventionally, the RTM 
arrangement is preferred) unless its power becomes extremely high. Therefore, in the 
most realistic cases (that is not too high union’s strength) the introduction of 
managerial delegation leads to the choice of the SEB agenda by monopoly firm 
which has the novel effect to be jointly preferred by monopolist, consumers and 
society. However the SEB agenda cannot be considered Pareto-improving because 
the union’s welfare would be harmed. 
To sum up, with managerial delegation monopoly firm’s profits are higher with 
Efficient Bargaining than Right-to-Manage (in particular, sequential bargaining is 
more profitable than the simultaneous one), while union’s welfare can be higher with 
RTM than EB (for reasonable values of its power). Thus, a conflict of interests 
between the bargaining parties may exist but, paradoxically, for reverted choices of 
the agenda (with respect to the standard case of profit-maximising firm). 
 
 
3. The model with network effects 
 
To this point, we have treated with the standard demand function of the good. 
However in many markets network externalities in consumption are important. 
The simple mechanism of network effects assumed here is that the surplus that a 
firm’s client obtains increases directly with the number of other clients of this firm 
(i.e. Katz and Shapiro, 1985).  
Following the recent literature (e.g. Hoernig, 2012; Battacharjee and Pal, 2014; and 
Chirco and Scrimitore, 2013), it is assumed the following linear direct demand faced 
by monopolist firm: 
nypaq       (30) 
where q denotes the quantity of the good produced by monopolist firm, y denotes the 
consumers' expectation about monopolist’s equilibrium production, the parameter n 
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 [0; 1) indicates the strength of  network effects (i.e. the higher the value of the 
parameter the stronger the network effects). 
The inverse demand functions are  as follows, where p is the price of good: 
nyqap        (31) 
Following Katz and Shapiro (1985) and the above mentioned literature, we impose 
the additional “rational expectations” conditions, i.e.  y= q,  in Stage 2. 
As usual, our equilibrium concept is subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, and we solve 
this game by the backward induction method. 
 
In the next section we analyse the cases of RTM, SEB and EB, respectively. 
 
3.1 RTM institution 
 
At stage 3, solving the maximisation problem of the monopoly firm’s manager, we 
get the following output function, for given consumers’ expectations: 
  
2
),(
nywza
wyq

      (32) 
and solving (32) by imposing the “rational expectations” condition above mentioned, 
the equilibrium quantity at stage 2 are given by: 
   
 
n
wza
wq



2
)(     (33) 
At the second stage of the game, under Right-to-Manage, the manager-union 
bargaining unit selects w, to maximize the following generalized Nash product, 
        bbbb
wtrw
qwwqznqwaVUN 
 11
...
))1((max  (34),  
where b  represents the bargaining union’s power.  
Maximising eq. (34) w.r.t. w, after substitution of eq. (33), we obtain the wage: 
   
 
2
)2()( bwbza
w

   (35) 
By using (35) we obtain output as a function of the weight on sales: 
 
 
 )2(2
)2(
)(
n
wzab
zqRTM


      (36) 
By using (35) and (36)  the profit as a function of the weight on sales is obtained 
  
 2)2(2
)2())1(2(()2()2(
)(
n
banbzbwwzab
zRTM


 , (37) 
and at the first stage of the game the monopolist maximises his profit selecting z: 
 
 
 
( )
0
2(1 )
RTM
n b a w
z
b n
   

  
 n b



   (38) 
The equilibrium outcomes are 
 
))1(2(2
))1(4()2(
nb
nbnwnab
wRTM


   (39) 
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 
))1(2(2
))(2(
nb
wab
qRTM


      (40) 
 
 )1(24
)2(
2
nb
wabRTM


      (41) 
 
 2
2
)1(24
)2)(2(
nb
wabnb
V RTM


     (42) 
 
 
22
2
(1 )(2 )
8 2(1 )
RTM
n b a w
CS
b n
   

 
    (43) 
 
 
2
2
(5 ) 6(1 ) (2 )( )
8 2(1 )
RTM
b n n b a w
SW
b n
     

 
  (44) 
 
3.2. Efficient Bargaining institution. 
 
Under efficient-bargaining the manager-union bargaining unit maximizes the 
following generalised Nash product, 
       bbbb qwwqznyqwaVUN )()( 11     (45).  
As in the previous section 2.2, the manager-union bargaining unit selects at the first 
stage w  and at the second stage q (or equivalently L) in the case of SEB or, 
alternatively, simultaneously w and q in the case of EB. 
 
3.2.1.  Sequential Efficient Bargaining  
At the third stage, from the first-order conditions of the efficient bargaining game 
between manager and union, the monopoly firm’s output function is the following: 
    wnyza
b
zwyq 


2
1
,, , (46) 
    From (46), after imposing the “rational expectations” conditions above mentioned, 
we obtain output for given w and z: 
   
 
nb
wza
zwq



2
),(         (47) 
At the second stage, after substitution of (47) in (45) and usual maximisation 
procedure w.r.t. w, we obtain the wage: 
( ) (2 )
2
SEB a z b w bw
   
       (48) 
By using (48) in (47) we obtain output as a function of z: 
)2(2
)2)((
)(
nb
bwza
zq SEB


      (49) 
By using (48) and (49)  the profit as a function of the weight on quantities is obtained: 
 
 2
22
)2(2
))23())1(2()1)(2())(2(
)(
nb
bbanbbzbbwazwb
zSEB


  (50) 
and at the first stage of the game the monopolist maximises his profit selecting z: 
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2
2
( )( 2
0 (2 )
2(1 )
SEB
a w b b n
z n b b
b b n
         
     
   (51) 
The equilibrium outcomes are 
))1(2(2
))1(4()2(
2
2
nbb
nbnbwnbab
wSEB


    (52) 
))1(2(2
)2)((
2 nbb
bwa
q SEB


       (53) 
))1(2(4
)2()(
2
2
nbb
bwaSEB


       (54) 
22
2
))1(2(4
)2())(2(
nbb
bwanbb
V SEB


      (55) 
2 2
2 2
(1 )( ) (2 )
8( 2(1 ))
SEB n a w bCS
b b n
   

   
    (56) 
2 2
2 2
( ) (2 ) 6(1 ) 4 (5 )
8( 2(1 ))
SEB
a w b n b b n
SW
b b n
        
   
 (57) 
 
3.2.2.  Simultaneous Efficient Bargaining  
 
From the system of first-order conditions of the efficient bargaining game between 
manager and union, the following system is obtained: 
    wnyza
b
zwyq 


2
1
,, , (58) 
   )()1(,, qaznybbwzqyw   (59)     
    After imposing the “rational expectations” condition, and solving the system (58)-
(59), we obtain  wage and output, as a function of z, respectively: 
( )
2
a z w
q z
n
  


      (60) 
( ) (2 )
( )
2
a z b w n b
w z
n
    


       (61) 
By using (60) and (61)  the profit as a function of the weight on quantities is obtained: 
 
 2)2
))1()1(()1()(
)(
n
banbzbwwza
zEB


    (62) 
and at first stage of the game the monopolist maximises his profit selecting z: 
 
bn
nb
bnwa
z EB 20
)1(2
)2)((







    (63) 
The other equilibrium outcomes are 
)1(2
))1(2(
nb
nbwab
wEB


      (64) 
)1(2
)(
nb
wa
qEB


       (65) 
14 
 
 
)1(4
2
nb
waEB


        (66) 
2
2
)1(4
)(
nb
wab
V EB


       (67) 
2
2
(1 )( )
8(1 )
EB n a wCS
b n
  

 
     (68) 
2
2
[4 3(1 )]( )
8(1 )
EB b n a wSW
b n
   

 
    (69) 
 
3.3. Benchmark equilibrium outcomes for the profit-maximising monopoly without 
managerial delegation and with network effects. 
 
Now we report here the equilibrium outcomes of the standard case of a profit-
maximising monopoly (PM) for the purpose of comparison with those of the 
managerial monopoly with network effects above presented, for the cases of RTM 
and SEB, respectively. 
 
 (2 )
2
RTM
PM
ab w b
w
  
     (39.bis) 
 
 
(2 )
2(2 )
RTM
PM
b a w
q
n
  


     (40.bis) 
 
 
22
2
(2 )
2(2 )
RTM
PM
b a w
n

  


     (41.bis) 
 
2
(2 )
4(2 )
RTM
PM
b b a w
V
n
  


     (42.bis) 
 
22
2
(1 )(2 )
8(2 )
RTM
PM
n b a w
CS
n
   


   (43.bis) 
   
2
2
2(3 2 ) (1 ) (2 )
8(2 )
RTM
PM
n b n b a w
SW
n
     


 (44.bis) 
 
(2 )
2
SEB
PM
ab w b
w
  
       (52.bis) 
( )(2 )
2(2 )
SEB
PM
a w b
q
b n
  

 
      (53.bis) 
2 2
2
(1 )( ) (2 )
4(2 )
SEB
PM
b a w b
b n

   

 
     (54.bis) 
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4(2 )
SEB
PM
b b a w
V
b n
  

 
      (55.bis) 
2 2
2
(1 )( ) (2 )
8(2 )
SEB
PM
n a w b
CS
b n
   

 
    (56.bis) 
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2
(2 )( ) [2(3 ) (3 )]
8(2 )
SEB
PM
b a w n b n
SW
b n
     

 
  (57.bis) 
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PM
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n
   


     (64.bis) 
2
EB
PM
a w
q
n
 


      (65.bis) 
 
2
2
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(2 )
EB
PM
b a w
n

  


      (66.bis) 
2
2
( )
(2 )
EB
PM
b a w
V
n
 


      (67.bis) 
 
2
2
(1 )
2(2 )
EB
PM
n a w
CS
n
  


     (68.bis) 
 
2
2
(3 )
2(2 )
EB
PM
n a w
SW
n
  


     (69.bis) 
 
Under network effect, Lemmas 1 and 3 hold true. However, Lemma 2 and Results 1, 
2 and 3 are modified and novel results emerge under network effects as regards the 
effects of the introduction of managerial delegation as well as the choice of the 
bargaining agenda. 
 
Lemma 4. Provided that n is sufficiently high, both managers are incentivized for 
output (employment) and in particular more incentivized under RTM than SEB (i.e. 
0 SEBRTM zz ).  
Proof: by comparing (38) and (51) we obtain that   
0 0 1 1RTM SEBz b n z b n
   
   
   
 
 
Result 4. Also with network effects the introduction of the managerial delegation in 
both bargaining arrangement cases at equilibrium increases the monopoly firm’s 
profit. By contrast, while without network effects such an introduction reduces the 
welfare of the union, consumer and society (see Res. 1), in the presence of sufficiently 
strong network effects it may enhance them. In particular the latter result occurs less 
likely under SEB.  
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Proof: 
, ,
0 , 0 1 1RTM RTM SEB SEB
i i PM i i PM
x x b n x x b n
   
     
   
, where x 
denotes a generic variable and i denotes unions’ utility, consumer welfare and social 
welfare, respectively (see also Figs. 1 and 2, where the content of this result is 
illustrated).  
 
 
Fig. 1. Plot of the “threshold curves” 0, 
RTM
PMi
RTM
i xx    in [n,b]-space . 
Legend: The curves are drawn for a given  value of a=1, w°=0. Since the curves are 
perfectly overlapping between them, then i) for all {n, b} combinations along the 
curve, 0, 
RTM
PMi
RTM
i xx  holds true; ii) for all {n, b} combinations below (above) the 
curve, unions’ utility, consumer welfare and social welfare are higher in the presence 
of managerial delegation (that is RTMPMi
RTM
i xx , >(<) 0 ). 
 
Fig. 2. Plot of the “threshold curves” 0, 
SEB
PMi
SEB
i xx    in [n,b]-space . 
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Legend: The curves are drawn for a given  value of a=1, w°=0. Since the curves are 
perfectly overlapping between them, then i) for all {n, b} combinations along the 
curve, 0, 
SEB
PMi
SEB
i xx  holds true; ii) for all {n, b} combinations below (above) the 
curve, unions’ utility, consumer welfare and social welfare are higher in the presence 
of managerial delegation (that is SEBPMi
SEB
i xx , >(<) 0 ). 
 
Now we preliminarily note that under network effects the equilibrium outcomes are 
different between sequential and simultaneous EB. The main reason why these differ 
is that under network effects the bargaining of wages occurs with EB (SEB) before 
(after) the fulfilment of the consumer’s expectations on output. 
  
Result 5. Also under network effects, the SEB agenda is the most profitable for the 
monopolist, and with highest welfare for consumer and society as a whole.  
Proof: the result straightforwardly follows by observing that 0SEB RTM   , 
0SEB EB   0SEB RTMCS CS  , 0SEB EBCS CS  , 0SEB RTMSW SW  , 
0SEB EBSW SW   
  
Result 6. While the SEB arrangement ensures the highest welfare for both the 
monopolist and consumer and society, the welfare’s comparison between EB and 
RTM is ambiguous and strictly depends on the relative strength of the network effect 
and the bargaining power. In particular the monopolist, the consumer and the society 
as a whole, prefer RTM to EB when n b  (and vice-versa). 
Proof: the result follows straightforwardly by observing that 
 bnEBRTM





 0 , bnCSCS EBRTM





 0 , bnSWSW EBRTM





 0 . 
 
Result 7. As regards the union, its utility may be the largest under SEB, provided that 
both n and b are sufficiently high (otherwise the relationship between the union’s  
utilities under the three bargaining arrangements is rather complex and shown in 
detail in Fig. 4, below). Proof: the result follows straightforwardly by the following 
inequalities: 
)1(8
)882()1632204(
0
23234








b
bbbbbbbb
nVV RTMSEB  
bn
b
bbbbb
VV EBRTM 



)2(2
42)84(
0
22
 
)2(2
42)8125(
0
22








b
bbbbb
nVV EBSEB  
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Fig. 4. Plot of the “threshold curves” 0,0,0  EBRTMSEBRTMSEBEB VVVVVV  in 
[n,b]-space . 
Legend: The curves are drawn for a given  value of a=1, w°=0. In the space’s regions 
A-H the following inequalities between union’s utilities hold:  
A= RTMEBSEB VVV  ; B= EBRTMSEB VVV  ; C= SEB RTM EBV V V  ; D= SEBEBRTM VVV  ; 
E= SEBRTMEB VVV  ; F= SEBEBRTM VVV  ; G= SEBRTMEB VVV  ; H= RTMSEBEB VVV  . 
 
Therefore unions’ utility is highest under SEB in regions A, B and C. This means that 
for sufficiently intense network effects the union may prefer SEB also when its power 
is realistically low. As a consequence, the following Remark holds. 
 
Remark: Provided that the network effect is sufficiently strong, also the union’s 
welfare may become larger under SEB even for union’s power relatively low. Thus in 
most realistic case as regards the bargaining power, the EB agenda is endogenously 
chosen by monopolist and union and such an agenda is also Pareto-superior. 
 
4. Conclusions. 
 
In this paper we have examined the issue of the bargaining agenda in a unionised 
monopoly in the presence of managerial delegation, showing that the latter is 
convenient for the monopoly firm also in the absence of strategic competition 
between firms. 
Since the unionisation is a widespread real-life phenomenon, then our results shed 
new light on the issue of the managerial delegation. In fact, since so far the sole 
motivation justifying the presence of managers’ contracts in monopolistic firms is 
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grounded on the existence of agency problems (e.g., Bolton and Dewatripont, 2004), 
our findings identify in the role played by manager’s incentive schemes in reducing 
the effects of the unionisation on monopoly profits a new channel through which 
managerial delegation can be effective even in the absence of strategic  competition 
between firms.
7
 In other words, the strategic value of the delegation is in the 
bargaining with unions rather than in the competition with rival firms. 
It is shown that i) in contrast to standard oligopoly results, managerial delegation 
benefits the monopolist, while harms consumers, workers and society; ii) in contrast 
to the conventional wisdom, monopoly profits with managerial delegation are higher 
with sequential Efficient Bargaining (SEB) than Right-to-Manage (RTM), while 
union’s welfare can be higher with RTM than EB: then a conflict of interests between 
the parties may exist but, paradoxically, for reverted choices of the bargaining 
agenda. 
Moreover, by also considering the presence of network effects, the welfare of 
monopolist, consumer, union, and society are enhanced by the introduction of 
managerial delegation with both bargaining arrangements, differently from the 
standard results of the VFJS’s approach where there are always conflicting effects 
between firms and society. In addition, the unique equilibrium bargaining 
arrangement (i.e. SEB) for the monopoly firm also ensures the highest welfare for the 
union and furthermore for all agents, provided that network effects are sufficiently 
intense. Therefore, policy makers may be inspired by this Pareto-superior effects of  
managerial delegation, network effects and SEB in their regulation of monopoly.  
A testable implication of these findings is that SEB arrangements should be more 
often stipulated in markets with strong positive consumption externalities. 
Finally a further direction of research should take into account explicitly the 
dynamics, which is crucial in a context with consumers’ expectations.8 By extending 
the present static model to a multi-period one, we conjecture that also the paper’s 
results may be enriched. 
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